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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to theoretically examine the welfare implications of public
sector involvement in agricultural biotechnology R&D. The model assumes that ￿rms
(either a private duopoly consisting of a pair of for-pro￿t ￿rms or a mixed duopoly
consisting of one for-pro￿t ￿rm and one public ￿rm) compete in a winner-take-all patent
race that is subject to R&D spillovers. Unlike previous research, spillovers are explicitly
incorporated into the race, and the size of the prize that accrues to the winner, as well
as the size of the ex post social surplus, is contingent on whether or not the public ￿rm
participates in the stage two product market.
The welfare results concerning the implication of public sector involvement in the R&D
race have several unexpected properties because of the interaction of the three sources of
market failure (underinvestment due to spillovers, overinvestment due to winner-take-all
racing and monopoly pricing in the product market). The main result is that the R&D
subsidy or tax, while e⁄ective at improving the e¢ ciency of the R&D outcome, is not
e⁄ective at correcting the monopoly pricing market failure in the product market. The
public ￿rm, on the other hand, is able to simultaneously shift the R&D outcome toward
￿rst-best and reduce the expected distortion in the product market. The public ￿rm
invests particularly aggressively when R&D spillovers are high and the deadweight loss
from monopoly pricing in the product market is high.
An important problem with public ￿rm participation in the R&D race is that cost
smoothing ine¢ ciencies arise because the public ￿rm will either invest at a relatively
high level to address the underinvestment externality, or invest at a relatively low level to
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1address the overinvestment externality. Cost smoothing considerations always prevents
attainment of ￿rst-best when product market externalities are present.
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21 Introduction
The agricultural biotechnology industry is characterized by heavy investment in research
and development (R&D) and rapidly increasing concentration in ownership of intellectual
property (Pray, Oehmke and Naseem 2005). Competition to secure patents is particularly
￿erce in the areas of transgenic biotechnology programs to develop herbicide-tolerant and
insect-resistant plants (Oehmke 2002). The public sector (i.e., universities and experiment
stations) has historically played an important role in agricultural R&D, and continues to be
an important contributor in the speci￿c area of agricultural biotechnology R&D (Oehmke
2002; Heisey, King and Rubenstein 2005).
The standard argument for public ￿rm inclusion in agricultural R&D is to correct an R&D
underinvestment market failure (Ruttan, 1980; Pinstrup-Andersen 2001). Private sector un-
derinvestment is largely due to monopoly product pricing and R&D spillovers, which arise
because of incomplete property rights. Intellectual property right assignments for biotech-
nology have grown considerably in recent years, so much in fact that policy makers are now
concerned with overinvestment and a duplication of e⁄ort caused by racing in a ￿winner-
take-all￿patenting race (Naseem and Oehmke 2004).
Various papers (e.g., Delbono and Denicolo 1993, Naseem and Oehmke 2004 and Ishibashi
and Matsumura 2005) have examined the welfare bene￿ts of replacing a for-pro￿t ￿rm with
a public ￿rm in a winner-take-all R&D patent race when there are no R&D spillovers and no
product market externalities. As is expected, the public ￿rm raises welfare because it slows
down the race and in doing so shifts the equilibrium outcome toward ￿rst-best. Although the
winner-take-all assumption is extreme and not representative of real-world R&D races (i.e.,
￿rms who compete but do not secure the patent will obtain some bene￿t because future R&D
builds on previous R&D), this benchmark case is nevertheless popular to examine because it
yields well-de￿ned results.
The purpose of the paper proposed here is to theoretically examine the welfare implica-
3tions of public sector involvement in agricultural biotechnology R&D. The model assumes
that ￿rms (either a private duopoly consisting of a pair of for-pro￿t ￿rms or a mixed duopoly
consisting of one for-pro￿t ￿rm and one public ￿rm) compete in a winner-take-all patent race
that is subject to R&D spillovers. Unlike previous research, spillovers are explicitly incorpo-
rated into the race, and the size of the prize that accrues to the winner, as well as the size of
the ex post social surplus, is contingent on whether or not the public ￿rm participates in the
stage two product market. In the private duopoly case, the winner of the patent is allowed
to extract monopoly pro￿ts from farmers after the innovation has been commercialized. In
the mixed duopoly case, monopoly pro￿ts are extracted if the winning ￿rm is for-pro￿t, and
the technology is distributed using competitive pricing if the winning ￿rm is public.
To establish the robustness of the theoretical results, the equilibrium is examined with and
without the assumption that a public regulator uses R&D subsidies or taxes to increase social
welfare. Thus, the general game has four stages. In stage one, the regulator announces the
R&D subsidy/tax schedule. In stage two, the biotechnology ￿rms involved in the R&D race
choose their respective levels of R&D e⁄ort. In stage three, the R&D e⁄ort levels determine
the outcome of the patent race probabilistically. In stage four, the winner distributes the
technology to farmers either at a competitive or monopolistic price. The welfare implications
of public sector involvement in the R&D race are established by comparing the social welfare
for the private duopoly with social welfare for the mixed duopoly.
The welfare results have several unexpected properties because of the interaction of the
three sources of market failure (underinvestment due to spillovers, overinvestment due to
winner-take-all racing and monopoly pricing in the product market). The main result is that
the R&D subsidy or tax, while e⁄ective at improving the e¢ ciency of the R&D outcome, is not
e⁄ective at correcting the monopoly pricing market failure in the product market. The public
￿rm, on the other hand, is able to simultaneously shift the R&D outcome toward ￿rst-best
and reduce the expected distortion in the product market. The public ￿rm invests particularly
aggressively when R&D spillovers are high and the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing
4in the product market is high.
An important problem with public ￿rm participation in the R&D race is that cost smooth-
ing ine¢ ciencies arise because the public ￿rm will either invest at a relatively high level to
address the underinvestment externality, or invest at a relatively low level to address the
overinvestment externality (R&D expenditures are subject to increasing marginal cost, so
equal levels of R&D e⁄ort across the two ￿rms maximizes cost-smoothing e¢ ciencies). Cost
smoothing considerations always prevents attainment of ￿rst-best when product market ex-
ternalities are present.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is set-up in section 2. We solve the game




The model has four stages. In stage one, a policy maker maximizes aggregate welfare across
all markets by o⁄ering a R&D subsidy (e.g., a prize conditioned on successful innovation) or
imposing a tax on innovation pro￿ts. In stage two, a pair of ￿rms engage in an R&D race to
produce a particular type of intellectual property, denoted I. The ￿rms are either a private
duopoly consisting of two for-pro￿t ￿rms, or a mixed duopoly consisting of one for-pro￿t ￿rm
and one public ￿rm, where the objective of the public ￿rm is to maximize aggregate welfare
across all markets. The race is "winner-take-all", so at the end of stage two, either nothing is
invented and both ￿rms earn negative pro￿ts equal to their R&D costs, or I is created with
exclusive control rights belonging to the winning ￿rm, and the losing ￿rm earning negative
pro￿ts equal to its R&D costs.
If I is created in stage two, this intellectual property (or a derivative technology or
product) is marketed in stage three. Successful creation of I in stage two also implies that
spino⁄ innovations are created in stage four. The inventor of I is assumed unable to extract
5rents from these spino⁄s, and thus the welfare generated by the stage four innovations is
an intertemporal spillover from the perspective of decision makers in stages one and two.
Unsuccessful creation of I in stage two implies zero welfare gains or losses for all agents in
stages three and four.
2.2 Stages Three and Four: Conditional Welfare
Let ￿ denote the welfare gains arising from the spino⁄innovations in stage four conditioned on
successful creation of I in stage two. Let ￿j denote the conditional welfare gain in the stage
three market, excluding the pro￿ts earned by the successful inventor of I, with j = f if the
winning innovator is a for-pro￿t ￿rm and j = g if the winner is a public agency. Associated
with this welfare gain is a conditional dead-weight loss of size Dj, 8j 2 ff;gg,which may
emerge in the stage three market due to non-competitive pricing of I. The pro￿ts earned by
the successful inventor of I (excluding subsidies/taxes established by the regulator in stage
one) is denoted ￿j. The innovation prize or tax on innovation pro￿ts, which is established by
the regulator in stage one, is denoted (￿ ￿ 1)￿f where ￿ ￿ 1 chosen by the regulator implies
a subsidy and ￿ ￿ 1 implies a tax. The values for ￿, ￿j, Dj and ￿j are exogenous to the
model.
Conditioned on successful creation of I in stage two, aggregate stages two and three
welfare (ignore discounting for time) is denoted S, and can be expressed as Sj = ￿+￿j +￿j,
8j 2 ff;gg.1 A key assumption for this analysis is Sg ￿ Sf. This assumption implies
that (￿g + ￿g) ￿
￿
￿f + ￿f￿
￿ 0, which in turn implies that Df ￿ Dg ￿ Cg ￿ Cf, where
Cj denotes the stage two cost of supplying I by its inventor if I is priced competitively.2
The Sg ￿ Sf assumption implies that if the public ￿rm happens to operate with a cost
disadvantage relative to a for-pro￿t ￿rm, then this cost disadvantage is more than o⁄set by
1This measure of social welfare includes a zero net welfare e⁄ect when the innovation subsidy/tax,
(￿ ￿ 1)￿
f, shifts between general tax revenue and the successful inventor of I.
2By de￿nition, ￿ + ￿ is equal to the market￿ s willingess to pay for I under competitive pricing less
the inventor￿ s cost of supplying I under competitive pricing less the deadweight loss associated with non-
competitive pricing. The market￿ s willingness to pay under competitive pricing is independent of pricing, and
therefore this term vanishes in the ￿ + ￿ comparison.
6a dead-weight loss di⁄erential for the two ￿rms.3
As is shown below, the model can be fully speci￿ed in terms of ￿f, Sf and Sg. Moreover,
the model can be normalized by de￿ning ￿f = Sf=￿f and ￿g = Sg=￿f. Thus, the stages
three and four welfare components of the model can be fully speci￿ed with two parameters,
￿f and ￿g, together with the restriction ￿g ￿ ￿f ￿ 1. There are also upper bounds on the
values of ￿f and ￿g, but these restrictions are not speci￿ed because they do not explicitly
enter the analysis.
If a for-pro￿t ￿rm wins the race to create I, then there are four alternative cases that will
be considered:
Market Distortion Spillover
No No ￿g = ￿f = 1 "no externality"
No Yes ￿g = ￿f > 1 "pure spillover"
Yes No ￿g > ￿f > 1 "market distortion"
Yes Yes ￿g > ￿f > 1 "market distortion"
The "no externality" case of ￿g = ￿f = 1 implies a situation of zero intertemporal
spillovers in stage four, identical stage three costs for the two types of ￿rms, perfect price
discrimination by the for-pro￿t ￿rm and no dead-weight loss associated with non-competitive
pricing by the public ￿rm. In this case, aggregate stage two and stage three welfare does
not depend on whether I is invented by a for-pro￿t ￿rm or by a public agency. This no
externality case was assumed by both Delbono and Denicolo and Ishibashi and Matsumura
in their dynamic analysis of an innovation race with a mixed R&D duopoly.
In the "pure spillover" case where ￿g = ￿f > 1, all of the previous conditions apply
except now ￿ > 0, which implies positive stage four spillovers. The speci￿c value of ￿ does
not a⁄ect the level of overinvestment in R&D by the two innovating ￿rms in stage two, who
are racing in the "winner-take-all" game. However, an increasing value of ￿ implies that the
￿rst-best level of investment is rising. Thus, if ￿ is increased beyond a su¢ ciently large value,
3The dead-weight loss for the private ￿rm can vary from zero in the case of perfect price discrimination to
a value equal to the standard monopoly dead-weight triangle for the case of uniform pricing. The dead-weight
loss created by the public agency￿ s pricing may be positive if the agency is required to use market revenue to
cover its ￿xed costs.
7the problem from the regulator￿ s perspective will switch from one of overinvestment by the
two ￿rms due to racing to one of underinvestment due to the spillover.
There are two "market distortion" cases described in the previous table, both of which
result in ￿g > ￿f > 1. An increase in the spillover parameter ￿ evenly raises ￿g and ￿f above
1. On the other hand, a market price distortion created by imperfect price discrimination
by the for-pro￿t inventor of I causes both ￿g and ￿f to rise above 1, and ￿g to rise above
￿f. Indeed, ￿f ￿1 is a measure of the normalized surplus that could not be captured by the
for-pro￿t supplier of I due to imperfect price discrimination, and ￿g￿￿f is positively related
to the size of the dead-weight loss associated with this imperfect price discrimination. In the
presence of a given pricing distortion, an increase in the spillover parameter, ￿, will raise the
values of ￿g and ￿f while preserving their di⁄erence.
3 Solution
3.1 Stage Two R&D Race
Let Pi, 8i = 1;2, denote the probability that ￿rm i is the successful innovator in the stage
two R&D race. This probability of success is a function of the R&D e⁄ort of both ￿rms, so
Pi = Pi(x1;x2) where x1 and x2 denote respective levels of R&D e⁄ort for the two ￿rms.
The stage two cost of R&D is identical for both ￿rms, and is given by the simple quadratic,






i if ￿rm i is for-pro￿t
Pi(x1;x2)Sg + Pj(x1;x2)Sf ￿ :5￿x2
i ￿ :5￿x2
j if ￿rm i is a public agency
(1)
Equation (1) shows that a for-pro￿t ￿rm cares only about private expected pro￿ts, whereas
the public ￿rm cares about expected aggregate welfare for all participants within stages two,
three and four. Implicit in the formulation of (1) is the assumption that when neither ￿rm
succeeds that occurs with probability (1 ￿ x1)(1 ￿ xj), there is no welfare change in stages
three and four, and ￿rm j earns negative :5￿x2
j in stage two.
4Fixed costs are of interest in this analysis only to the extent that they are such that it is optimal for
exactly two ￿rms to engage in the R&D race. It is assumed that the surplus measures derived in stage two
include a particular level of ￿xed costs which achieve this outcome.
8To obtained closed form solutions for the problem, assume Pi = xi(1 ￿ :5xj). This
particular speci￿cation emerges if each ￿rm faces probability x of inventing I and probability
1￿x of not inventing I. In the event that both ￿rms are simultaneously successful in inventing
I, then the ￿rm which wins the actual control rights of I is decided by a "￿ ip-of-a-coin".5 Now
substitute Pi = xi(1 ￿ :5xj) into equation (1) and divide through by ￿. Letting ￿ = ￿f=￿,







xi (1 ￿ :5xj)￿￿ ￿ :5x2
i if ￿rm i is for-pro￿t
xi (1 ￿ :5xj)￿g￿ + xj (1 ￿ :5xi)￿f￿ ￿ :5x2
i ￿ :5x2
j if ￿rm i is a public agency
(2)
It is now possible to proceed with the analysis armed with the result that minimizing
the di⁄erence between x1 and x2 to achieve a particular probability of innovation success is
e¢ cient. Returning to (2), the two ￿rms are assumed to choose their respective levels of R&D
e⁄ort simultaneously. Thus, the Nash assumption is appropriate, and reaction functions can
be obtained using the standard procedures of optimization.
3.1.1 The private duopoly case
First consider the case of two for-pro￿t ￿rms, referred to as a private duopoly (variables are
superscripted with a "pd"). In this case, the reaction function for ￿rm i can be expressed
as xi = (1 ￿ :5xj)￿￿. The equilibrium level of e⁄ort, obtained by jointly solving this pair of









It is necessary for 0 ￿ x
pd
i ￿ 1, so restrictions on the various parameters of the model, as
well as the stage one control variable, ￿, are needed. The restrictions for this case and the
subsequent cases are imposed gradually as the analysis proceeds.
5The probability that both ￿rms simultaneously invent I is equal to x1x2. If ￿rm i has a 50% chance
of being ￿rst to the patent o¢ ce in such an event, then the probability of achieving control rights over I is
equal to :5x1x2. Add to this the probability that ￿rm i is successful and ￿rm j is unsuccessful, and the total
probability that ￿rm i achieves control rights over I is :5xixj + xi(1 ￿ xj) = xi(1 ￿ :5xj).
9The x
pd











, to obtain an expression for ￿rm i￿ s equilibrium probability of







Let c Wpd denote the equilibrium level of normalized expected welfare for all market partic-
ipants in stages two, three and four in the private duopoly case. In the private duopoly





















. Dividing through by ￿ and substituting




i allows an expression for the equilibrium level of








3.1.2 The mixed duopoly case
Next consider the case where the R&D race involves one for-pro￿t ￿rm and one public ￿rm,
referred to as a mixed duopoly (variables are superscripted with a "md"). Using (2), the
reaction function for the for-pro￿t ￿rm is the same as the previous case: xf = (1 ￿ :5xg)￿￿.
The reaction function for the public ￿rm can be expressed as xg = (￿g ￿ ￿xf)￿, where
￿ = :5(￿f + ￿g). Solving these two equations gives expressions for the equilibrium level of

































10The aggregate welfare function for the mixed duopoly case can be expressed as
c Wmd = Pmd
f Sf + Pmd











Divide though by ￿ and substitute in the expressions for xmd
i and Pmd
i to obtain the desired
equilibrium expression
Wmd =
￿fN1 + ￿gN2 ￿ :5(N3)
2 ￿ :5(N4)
2
￿￿2 (1 ￿ :5￿￿￿2)
2 (6)
where: N1 = ￿ (1 ￿ :5￿g￿)





, N3 = ￿ (1 ￿ :5￿g￿)
and N4 = ￿g ￿ ￿￿￿.
3.2 Stage One: Optimal R&D Subsidy/Tax
In stage one, the regulator chooses ￿ to maximize equilibrium pro￿ts
￿
Wj￿￿ with j = pd for
the private duopoly case, and j = md for the mixed duopoly case. Using (4), the welfare
maximizing value for ￿ in the private duopoly case is
￿pd =
2￿f
2 + ￿￿f : (7)
If this expression is substituted into (3), an expression for the policy-optimized probability











Similarly, substitution of (7) into (3) allows an expression for policy-optimized welfare for the










The expression for optimal ￿ in the mixed duopoly case is obtained by maximizing Wmd
given by (6):
￿md =
￿f (1 ￿ :5￿g￿) ￿ :5(￿g)
2 ￿
1 ￿ :5(1 + ￿￿)￿g￿
: (10)
This expression can be substituted into equations (5) and (6) to obtain expressions for the
policy-optimized probability of a successful innovation and the corresponding level of system
welfare for the case of mixed duopoly.
113.3 Endogenous Restrictions on ￿
At this point it is useful to digress in order to impose restrictions on ￿, which is a key
parameter in the model. As indicated earlier, the welfare measures calculated above include
￿xed costs. Let F denote the level of ￿xed cost for one ￿rm, either for-pro￿t or public. In a
￿rst-best solution (allowing for spillovers; i.e. ￿f = ￿g ￿ 1), the variable e¢ ciency gains from
operating two R&D facilities versus one must be greater than F. In the current analysis, the
implicit assumption is that the ￿rst-best solution entails two R&D facilities incurring ￿xed
costs 2F rather than one R&D facility incurring ￿xed cost F. Suppose that ￿f = ￿g = ￿ or
equivalently Sg = Sf = S. As is shown next, this assumption imposes a restriction on the
feasible range of values for the normalized market surplus with spillover S=￿ or equivalently
￿￿.
Total system surplus plus ￿xed costs for the two-￿rm ￿rst-best case is given by (9) with
￿f = ￿. This is because the optimized policy variable ￿ has eliminated all externalities in
the R&D market (i.e., racing and failing to account for spillover). Thus, ￿rst-best system






Total system welfare plus ￿xed costs for the one-￿rm ￿rst-best case is equal to :5(￿￿)
2, which
can be obtained by optimizing x￿￿ ￿ :5x2 with respect to x. Therefore, it is necessary to
restrict ￿￿ to be lower than 1 in order for the probability x to be lower than 1.
The net bene￿t from operating two R&D facilities versus one in the ￿rst best case is hence










2 (1 ￿ ￿￿)
2(1 + ￿￿)
￿ F: (12)
If F is positive but not excessively large, then it is easy to establish that there exists
two critical values for ￿￿, denoted (￿￿)min, (￿￿)max 2 (0;1), with (￿￿)min< (￿￿)max, where
(￿￿)min is increasing in F and (￿￿)max is decreasing in F. For ￿￿ 2 ((￿￿)min, (￿￿)max), net
system ￿rst-best welfare is higher with two R&D facilities versus one. A lower bound on ￿￿
12emerges because ￿￿ is an index of the normalized conditional pro￿tability of the R&D, and so
a su¢ ciently high level of pro￿tability is needed before the ￿xed costs of the additional R&D
operating can be covered. The upper bound on ￿￿ is more complicated to explain. Notice
from (12) that with F = 0, net multi-facility bene￿t is a ￿rst increasing then decreasing
function, equal to zero both with ￿￿ = 0 and ￿￿ = 1. The maximum value of this bene￿t




. To understand the properties of the net multi-facility bene￿t
function, it is necessary to further digress and examine the issue of cost smoothing versus
duplication of e⁄ort.
With zero ￿xed costs, why would a ￿rst-best regulator choose interior values for both
x1 and x2 rather than choosing a corner solution with one x set to zero? To answer this
question, it can be seen that a P = P0 indi⁄erence curve for the total probability of successful
innovation, P = 1￿(1 ￿ xi)(1￿xj) = xi+xj ￿xixj, is a downward sloping concave function
when mapped in x1 and x2 space. The concavity of the function reveals the duplication of
e⁄ort that emerges when two ￿rms rather than one ￿rm engage in identical R&D.6 However,
it can also be seen that indi⁄erence curves corresponding to higher value of P0 are more
concave. Thus, the e¢ ciency loss from duplication of e⁄ort becomes larger as R&D intensity
(i.e., the scale of the project) increases.







a downward sloping concave function when mapped in x1 and x2 space. In this case, the
concavity of the function implies that e¢ ciency gains arise from cost smoothing (i.e., the cost
of achieving a given probability of success is lower with two R&D facilities versus one).7 In
order for the optimal solution to involve positive values for both x1 and x2 it is therefore






indi⁄erence curve to be globally more concave than the
P0 = xi +xj ￿xixj indi⁄erence curve. It is easy to show that this condition holds given the
6Speci￿cally, P = xi + xj ￿ xixj implies that the total probability of success is less than the sum of
the individually probabilities of success if the individual ￿rms were alone in the market. Hence, there is a
duplication of e⁄ort.
7The ￿rst-best solution is obtained by ￿rst minimizing the cost of achieving a speci￿c probability of success,
and then calculating the welfare maximizing probability level using the derived probability cost function.
13particular functional forms chosen for this analysis.8
The shape of the net multi-facility bene￿t function given by (12) can now be explained. As
￿￿ increases, the increasing scale of the project initially increases the net bene￿t of operating
with two R&D facilities, but as ￿￿ increases toward one, this net bene￿t eventually decreases
and then vanishes. The reason for the decrease is that a higher value for ￿￿ implies an
e¢ ciency loss from duplication of e⁄ort that is growing relative to the e¢ ciency gain from
cost smoothing. In the extreme case when ￿￿ = 1, the duplication of e⁄ort loss is exactly
o⁄set by the cost-smoothing gain and the net bene￿t is equal to zero.
4 Results
4.1 In the absence of externality
We ￿rst focus on the ￿no externality￿situation where ￿g = ￿f = 1. Recall that this case is
characterized by zero intertemporal spillovers in stage four, identical stage three costs for the
two types of ￿rms, perfect price discrimination by the for-pro￿t ￿rm and no dead-weight loss
associated with non-competitive pricing by the public ￿rm. We also assume for the moment
that no tax/subsidy policy is available, that is ￿ = 1.
Given the previous results, we obtain that the ￿rst best R&D e⁄ort is ￿=(1 + ￿) for both
￿rms. The equilibrium individual e⁄ort for a private duopoly is given by x
pd
i = 2￿=(2 + ￿)








1 ￿ :5￿2: (13)
First, note that there is overinvestment in a private duopoly (x
pd
i > ￿=(1+￿)). Second, it
can be easily checked that, whatever the value of ￿; a for pro￿t ￿rm exerts more R&D e⁄ort
in mixed duopoly as xmd
f > x
pd
i for any i = 1;2. It is also straightforward to remark that















0. If x1 = 0; then to remain on the K
0 indi⁄erence curve it is necessary for
x2 = 2x0 ￿x
2
0 and to remain on the P






curve is therefore globally more concave than the P




0 < 2x0 ￿ x
2
0.
14the public ￿rm invests less than the private ￿rm as xmd
g < xmd
f . The positive gap between
xmd
f and xmd
g is also increasing in ￿ which suggests that the equilibrium allocation of R&D
e⁄orts is more and more asymmetric when the social return of innovation relative to cost is




i for any ￿ and any i = 1;2). Note that xmd
g is a concave function with xmd
g = 0
when ￿ = 1 or 0.
We are now able to prove the following result regarding the interest of having a mixed
duopoly in R&D activities.
Proposition 1 In the absence of a tax/subsidy policy, the presence of a public ￿rm in a
mixed duopoly is welfare improving compared to the situation of a private duopoly. This
welfare gain comes at a social cost in terms of non optimal allocation of R&D e⁄ort so that
a mixed duopoly only achieves a second best optimum, except in the limit case where ￿ = 1.
Proof: To prove the result, it su¢ ces to compare the private duopoly welfare and the
mixed duopoly welfare in the absence of a tax/subsidy policy (that is when ￿ = 1). We
obtain:
Mixed duopoly W￿=1 ￿ Private duopoly W￿=1 =
￿4 ￿
4 + ￿2 ￿
2￿2 + ￿ ￿ 5
￿￿
8(1 + ￿)(2 + ￿)4(1 ￿ :5￿2)
which is positive, increasing and convex for ￿ 2 (0;1).
To show that a mixed duopoly only achieves second best optimum, let us compute the
di⁄erence between ￿rst-best welfare and mixed duopoly welfare:
First best WFB - Mixed duopoly W￿=1 =
￿4(1 ￿ ￿)
8(1 ￿ :5￿2)
2 (1 + ￿)
This indicates that welfare for the mixed duopoly equals ￿rst best when ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1.
This di⁄erence is actually ￿rst increasing then decreasing in ￿. For all other values of ￿,
mixed duopoly welfare is thus strictly less than ￿rst-best welfare.
Notice that mixed duopoly achieves ￿rst best when ￿ = 1. The reason for this is that the
public ￿rm stops producing at ￿ = 1 in the mixed duopoly, as indicated by (13). Hence, we
15are comparing a single-￿rm case to a multi-facility ￿rst best case. From above we know that
in a ￿rst-best world, using a single ￿rm versus two ￿rms achieves the same level of welfare
when ￿ = 1. So the mixed duopoly achieves the ￿rst-best outcome by shutting down one ￿rm
and inducing the private ￿rm to produce at the ￿rst-best single ￿rm level. In others words,
the e¢ ciency loss of the public ￿rm in terms of misallocation of e⁄orts is increasing in the
scale until the di⁄erence in e⁄orts becomes su¢ ciently large. When this di⁄erence in e⁄orts
is very large, this implies that the public ￿rm is e⁄ectively eliminated from participating in
R&D and thus cost smoothing is no longer an issue.
Moreover, the ine¢ ciency of the unregulated private duopoly is worse when ￿ is larger.
This can be seen by establishing that ￿rst best welfare and welfare for the private duopoly
with ￿ = 1 are both increasing convex functions, with the former strictly above the latter.
If one regulates optimally the R&D activities through a tax/subsidy, the following result can
be established.
Proposition 2 In the absence of externality, regulating a private duopoly through taxation
yields ￿rst-best optimum.
Proof: This follows of direct comparison between (9) taken when ￿f = 1 and the ￿rst-
best welfare indicated by (11). The optimal R&D tax level is ￿pd = 2=(2 + ￿) < 1 for
￿ 2 (0;1). Hence, an appropriate positive tax on innovation return allows to eliminate the
overinvestment problem in a private duopoly. A direct consequence of Proposition 2 is the
following result.
Corollary 3 Having a public ￿rm in R&D activities without regulating the private ￿rm is
not su¢ cient to obtain ￿rst best.
Obviously, imposing a tax on innovation return for the private ￿rm that competes with a
public ￿rm in a mixed duopoly would also restore ￿rst best.
164.2 In the presence of spillovers
Here we have ￿g = ￿f = ￿ > 1: It can be shown that most of the results contained in the
last subsection are still valid in that case.
First note that in the unregulated private duopoly, R&D e⁄orts and hence pro￿ts are
independent of the level of spillovers. This is no longer the case when there are spillovers.




and which allows the regulator to implement the ￿rst best e⁄ort given by ￿￿=(1+￿￿): More
precisely, there exists a unique threshold value ^ ￿ such that when ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ there would be
overinvestment due to R&D racing in an unregulated private duopoly and consequently the
optimal regulation amounts to tax private ￿rms (￿pd < 1). On the contrary when ￿ > ^ ￿, there
is underinvestment due to the existence of strong spillovers and the regulator implements a
subsidy (￿pd > 1). In the limit case where ￿ = ^ ￿ ￿ 2=(2 ￿ ￿) laissez-faire is optimal.
Furthermore, for pro￿t ￿rms loose from the introduction of the regulation when spillover are
low (￿ < ^ ￿) while they bene￿t from the introduction of the subsidy when spillovers are high
(￿ > ^ ￿). Their pro￿ts increase with the level of spillovers, because the tax is less and less
important before the threshold value and it becomes eventually a negative tax beyond the
threshold value. Proposition 2 can then be extended to the case of pure spillover as follows.
Proposition 4 In the case of pure spillover, regulating a private duopoly through taxation
(when spillovers are low) or subsidy (when spillovers are high) yields ￿rst-best optimum.
Now consider the situation of an unregulated mixed duopoly.
Proposition 5 The relative value of a mixed duopoly compared to an unregulated duopoly is
positive for any value of ￿. Moreover, it is ￿rst decreasing with ￿ up to a threshold value ^ ￿
and then increasing. At the threshold value, ￿rst best is obtained with a mixed duopoly or an
unregulated duopoly as well.
17Actually one can show that when ￿ < ^ ￿ (low spillover), the leader in terms of R&D
e⁄ort in a mixed duopoly is the private ￿rm: The public ￿rm reduces the overinvestment
problem by decreasing its e⁄ort. Conversely, when ￿ > ^ ￿ (high spillover) the problem is now
to increase R&D e⁄ort and the leader is the public ￿rm.
4.3 In the presence of market distortions and spillovers
The ￿rst thing to note is that having a public ￿rm in place is a good thing to diminish the
extent of market distortions. This holds for any values of ￿f and ￿g as soon as ￿f < ￿g.
Note that unlike the previous case (pure spillover), regulating the innovation activity of a
private ￿rm competing with a public ￿rm in a mixed duopoly would not restore ￿rst best,
because innovation regulation does not eliminate product market distortions.
Let us consider the situation where the regulatory problem concerns underinvestment
(that is when ￿f and ￿g are large enough). In this case, if there were no product market
distortions, the e⁄ort of the for pro￿t ￿rm in a mixed duopoly would be higher than the
equivalent e⁄ort in an unregulated duopoly. If there is su¢ ciently large market distortions,
we would obtain the reverse result as the public ￿rm would induce the for pro￿t ￿rm to
decrease its winning probability in order to save for market e¢ ciency losses. The public
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